Veganism as Resistance: Confronting the Banality of Evil in Food Production

The Banality of Evil is a phrase coined by Hannah Arendt, one of the most influential political philosophers and historians of the 20th century, in her book Eichmann in Jerusalem. In this book, Arendt argues that Adolf Eichmann, a key figure in the Nazi Party and participant in enabling the Holocaust, was not psychotic or particularly anti-semitic in his personal beliefs. Instead, he was “just following orders”, lacked critical thinking skills and believed he had no individual ability to make an impact.

In other words, Eichmann was not particularly evil. Here, a distinction is made between a person who commits evil and a person who is evil in psychology or nature. Eichmann is a clear example of the former but not the latter. Whilst most certainly not a justification for committing evil, Eichmann’s psychology empirically explains many of the evils his actions supported. Even though it may be hard not to picture all Nazis as psychological monsters, many studies, including the Milgram and Stanford Prison experiments (which both, admittedly, have significant flaws), support the belief that relatively ‘normal’ people can be brought to do unethical actions through obedience to authorities without exercising their own conscience. Rather than seeing the consequences of their actions, evaluating the harm caused and then refusing the participate in such evils, the moral agents routinely fail to question instructions from superiors and social pressure, and so continue causing harm to others.

Across all societies today, there are evils indirectly reinforced by authority figures and social norms of what is considered acceptable, many of which are expressed in food production. The biggest culprit by the scale of suffering caused is the animal agriculture industry. According to The Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations (FAO), ~80 billion farm animals are killed annually. This number is growing rapidly as meat consumption increases and does not even factor in the 200 million tonnes of sea life killed yearly. To understand the suffering behind each individual sentient being behind these statistics is an impossible task. Yet, it should be obvious that each being subjected to creation, rearing, and death to be consumed is morally unacceptable. Although some individuals may be oblivious to the scale of suffering, it is doubtful that any adults reading this article are unaware of the suffering inherent in the production of animal products, or truly believe that non-human animals are not sentient or morally valuable.

 
 

There are several psychological reasons why some people still choose to eat meat, even though they know that it is morally wrong. For many people, eating meat is tied to cultural traditions and social norms. Food is a key component of national and familiar identity, and changing traditions may seem like an affront to tradition. Yet traditions always change and should incorporate positive aspects initially seen as external. Tradition is also under a moral imperative to change when it causes excessive harm. For example, human sacrifice and widow burning have been part of various cultures throughout time. Participants and supporters of such evils were not necessarily psychopathic or particularly ideologically motivated but instead may have been guided by the norms of those around them and, in particular, those in positions of authority. Nevertheless, these practices have been rightfully been condemned and outlawed.

Most people in the West would argue that rearing and slaughtering dogs or cats for human consumption is wrong. This is despite the fact that those who consume dogs or cats are no different from those who consume chickens, cows or pigs, all else being the same. Even if culture may provide an empirical explanation for bad actions, it does not provide a philosophical justification for such actions. Exploiting sentient beings, as is done in the animal agriculture industry, is wrong no matter which species are being exploited or in which culture the exploitation takes place.

Another reason some people may continue to eat meat even if they recognise that it is immoral is due to psychological barriers. Cognitive dissonance is a negative feeling which occurs when one recognises that their actions do not align with their beliefs. This is a taxing mental state, and it may be easier to avoid evaluating the consequences of their actions. People may deliberately avoid learning about the animal agriculture industry because the harsh realities animals are subjected to can be emotionally overwhelming. When cognitive dissonance materialises, individuals may attempt to justify their immoral actions through poor arguments, such as by appealing to the problem of over-determination. This argument incorrectly suggests that an individual has no positive impact if they go vegan.

Those who do this are not evil for attempting to protect themselves from this mental toll even though they perform immoral actions and are weak-willed. Those who know that animal agriculture is unethical may be fearful of alienation from their peers or may not wish to invest the effort in learning how to adopt a vegan lifestyle, and thus fail to adjust to their actions accordingly. Once again, this is an empirical explanation for inaction, but not a philosophical justification. It should be clear that the moral solution to cognitive dissonance is to align actions with values so long as the values are correct.

If the empirical claim that many meat eaters know that animal agriculture is unethical but fail to become vegan due to weak appeals to culture, comfort and convenience, those who eat meat should be seen through the same lens as those who participated in the Holocaust without any particular ideological motivation. A lack of critical thinking, an incorrect belief in over-determination and a failure to stray from social norms are present in both examples. In this way, veganism can be framed as resistance against the banality of evil.

Those who take offence to this comparison are misguided. Firstly, if one takes offence at the comparison between the Holocaust and animal agriculture because it appears to devalue the immense suffering of Jews and other oppressed humans, one is viewing the comparison through a speciesist lens. The aim of the animal liberation movement is not to reduce humans to the level which non-human animals currently stand in society. Rather it aims to use the principle of equal consideration to elevate the plight of non-human animals. Both the Holocaust and animal agriculture are comparable in that they violate the rights of individuals and cause needless suffering of the highest magnitude. If one takes offence that those who consume meat are compared to those who participated in the Holocaust, one has misunderstood the banality of evil. The banal nature of such evils implies that the evil-doers are mistaken rather than inherently evil, and thus, the attack on non-vegans character is somewhat minimised.

Not only does this provide an interesting framework through which to view the moral character of non-vegans, but it also provides normative guidance for vegan activists. This framework suggests that the impact of moral reasoning on an individual’s actions may be limited. Whilst moral reasoning is needed to provide a philosophical justification for veganism and, in particular, convince early adopters of veganism to resist the banality of evil, additional tactics are required to change the actions of those less motivated by ethical arguments. If complacency can result in evils like the Holocaust or animal agriculture, actions must be taken to change social structures so that veganism is perceived as the norm, and that non-veganism is seen as an evil which sits in direct contrast with this. Even if non-violent, vegan activism should remain the primary tool to promote animal rights, the limitations of human rationality must be accounted for. So long as carnism is a convenient social norm, individuals will fail to critically assess their actions, and billions of innocent animals will suffer.

Kevin Linton

Kevin is studying for a Master’s in International and European Law and Business at Uppsala University and also works full-time as a Data Privacy Specialist. He writes about politics and philosophy, particularly animal ethics and the environment, and is active in local activism.

https://kevinlinton.co
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